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THE STRATEGY OF THE INCLUSIVE EDUCATION APPARATUS

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the nineties the separation between special and regular education and the parallel separation in the student population has become an increasingly disputed issue. Of course, this discussion is much older – as old as the separation itself – but the debate seems to have reached a decisive turn in the last decade of the 20th century. Indeed the call for “inclusive education” apparently puts the separation itself radically into question. Proponents and promoters of “inclusion” plea for the abolition of special education as such and for a transformation of regular education so that it becomes open and accessible for all. In this sense, inclusive education goes further than the former proposals and projects concerning integration and care. These still maintain the existing distinction as a horizon and propose adaptations that continue to take the separation as starting point. Therefore, the proposals for “inclusive education” seem to question a horizon which has been evident for a long time. Some even call it a new paradigm, the paradigm of inclusion. This change in paradigm involves not only a new (pedagogic) attitude towards “disabled” persons, but also towards “non-disabled” persons. It would point to a new way of thinking about education in which the necessity for segregation is excluded. In brief, “inclusive education” would be education that meets the needs of every individual student and takes them into account. It makes the distinction between normal and “abnormal” superfluous and is a first step towards an “inclusive society”.

In this contribution we want to deal with inclusion in education and society from a specific perspective. Our starting point is the question how we have to understand “the individual”, “education” and “society” in this context? Is the individual and his/her individual needs simply what appears once the pernicious classifications in terms of normal and abnormal have vanished? Are those classifications

merely persistent labels and categorisations which hid for long time the true face of the child or the adult and which are seen through now, at the beginning of the 21st century? Or in other words, closer to our own idiom: does the “true” face of the individual appear once the norms which distinguish differences and consequently separate individuals from each other are abolished? Or is there no “true face”, but just a new mask? The proponents of inclusion have to make the first supposition. But we want to show that in fact inclusion implies a new mask in the sense that the “inclusive school” and the “inclusive society” are not addressing *the* human individual (as such), but themselves call a particular type of individuality into being: one which assumes that what makes human beings into individuals is their entrepreneurial relation towards their needs.

In order to deal with inclusion from this perspective, it is important to start with a preliminary remark. It is very tempting to approach education in terms of principles and to consider the actual school and education system as a successful or unsuccessful realisation of these principles. So we can find the liberal premise that the school system constitutes the means which society provides to the individual for her to achieve self-development and self-realisation. Or the Marxist theories which reveal the reproduction mechanisms in the education system and propose a form of education which can realise the blueprint of an equal society. An appeal to principle is also characteristic of the proponents of inclusion: to organise education in accordance with the principle of “good education for all”. But following Foucault and Hunter, we believe that such a principled approach does not allow us to understand the actual establishment and development of the school (Foucault, 1982; Hunter, 1994, 1996; see also Popkewitz, 1998). Rather than understanding the school in terms of the (successful or unsuccessful) realisation of a principle, we want to understand the modern school in terms of an “assemblage” (Hunter). This means that the modern school is made up of a number of elements (techniques, instruments, forms of knowledge) with their own specific history and which have been assembled in such a way that they constitute a whole that is more or less stable and is referred to by the concept of “the education system”. The stability of this whole or entity articulates itself in its strategic character i.e. it appears as a kind of solution strategy for a number of problems which present themselves in society. Following Foucault, we can call this strategic whole an “apparatus” (“un dispositif”) having a strategy or

“intentionality” which is “not subjective” (Foucault 1976, pp. 124–125). In this sense we can speak of a historically contingent assemblage of the education apparatus.

The first part of the paper is a very brief historical excursion focussing on two main elements of the modern education apparatus: the pedagogical and the governmental. In this short genealogy, we draw attention to the figure of “the social and normalised self” and the strategic dimension of “the social”. This enables us to argue in the second part what is at stake in the actual (“post-modern”) governmental regime: the figure of the “entrepreneurial self” which implies governmental relations and techniques directed at inclusion. In the third part then, we explore how this inclusion functions at the level of education.

The Modern Education Apparatus: The Pedagogical and Governmental Gaze

According to Hunter, we have to return to what Foucault called “pastoral power” in order to indicate a first element of the modern school (Hunter, 1994, 1996). This pastoral power has a Christian origin and has called into being a very particular form of subjectivity (a subject form). That is to say that a certain number of techniques, e.g. the systematic investigation of one’s consciousness and the confession, have been put into practice to produce a certain relation of the self towards the self. Thus, the “subject” is neither a given nor a foundation but the result of concrete practices which make it possible for us to look at ourselves (and at others and the world) in a very specific way. This technology of pastoral power teaches us to problematize our desires in the light of a moral law or of reason, it teaches us that we have to submit ourselves to certain rules in order to attain freedom and it teaches us how to understand our “commissions and omissions” in terms of responsibility, identity and normality as member of a community or as part of a divine order.

There exists of course a history of the school and more specifically a history of knowledge concerning the student (pupil), of teaching and of the applied techniques. Psychology, educational sciences, didactics and all kinds of educational techniques became part of the school context. It is important for our analysis to underline that it is precisely in this configuration that the figure of “the student (pupil)” makes its appearance, or maybe better: it is in this configuration that appears the space in which s/he can and should be approached in

terms of development, experience and motivation and in which questions are raised about an appropriate educational method and organisation of the class. This implies that “the student” is not a given, but is constituted as the effect and the instrument of an assembled educational environment.¹ S/he is effect since “the student” appears only within a certain regime of what can be said and be seen. S/he is an instrument since this educational regime aims at producing a specific relation to the self. In other words, within this regime the figure of “the student” occupies an epistemological-strategic position. S/he constitutes the crystallisation point around which different forms of knowledge develop and offers at the same time the point where different techniques can grasp and hold. Moreover, in this regime the pastor or mentor (“teacher”) can appear as someone who disposes of an experienced eye and of appropriate techniques to descry the typical characteristics of the student, to perform evaluations and practice corrections. In short, the educational regime of what can be said and be seen under a pastoral-pedagogical gaze comes into being together with a “will to know” which constitutes the student as effect and instrument.

Since it is not possible in this paper to describe the history and figure of the student in a detailed way, we confine ourselves to a central element i.e. social normality. Normality refers to the statistical distribution of mental and physical characteristics around a central mean or norm. As a consequence we “no longer ask, in all seriousness, what is human nature? Instead we talk about normal people. We ask, is this behaviour normal? Is it normal for an eight-year-old girl to ...” (Hacking, 1990, p. 161). Thus, the normal appears when the population mean is taken as the criterion instead of human nature. What is important to our analysis is to indicate how within this modern pedagogic regime a specific individualisation of the student comes about. Individuality appears in relation to the collective level of the population or more generally in relation to the social and implies “[a reduction of] the being of each and every one to his/her social being” (Ewald, 1996, p. 123, authors translation). In this sense the social view becomes characteristic for the pedagogic gaze. It is only under this view or gaze that the individuality of the student appears and that we can think about typical attitudes, behaviours,

¹ This Foucauldian line of thought is also taken up by Popkewitz albeit in a somewhat different way, where he analyses how a “scaffolding” of discourses on/of schooling and education “makes the teacher and the child” (Popkewitz, 1998, p. 18).

physical characteristics, performances, deviations. However, such a “social” gaze on the level of the student population as a whole implies also that this population can be divided, that a knowledge of particular populations (or parts of a population) becomes possible and specific treatment and approaches can be developed. As we will try to show later, inclusive education has to be related precisely to the disappearance of this social dimension. Or rather, insofar as the “post-modern” educational regime becomes entrepreneurial (instead of social) the individuality of the student shows itself in a new way. But first we have to pay attention to the second element of the assemblage of the education apparatus: the modern state.

According to Foucault it is not so much the “étatization of society” but rather the “governmentalisation of the state” which characterizes the modern state (Foucault 1978, p. 656). This means that “the state” is a complex of centralising governing relationships which aims at governing people. For that reason, the modern governmental state confronts not only subjects (of rights) but a population which has to be governed. This “populational reasoning”, as Popkewitz calls it, referring to Castel (1991) and Hacking (1990) “emerged with state reform tactics concerned with administering social welfare” (Popkewitz, 1998, p. 25). Understanding the people as a population means that we can speak for example of birth and death rates, of epidemics, of labour forces, etc. and that, beside the classic juridical instruments, a lot of regulation techniques can be put into action in order to direct and govern this population (and the processes related to it). In this sense, we should not start the analysis from the dichotomy between state and society but from differences between governmental gazes (which for example produce this state/society dichotomy). Here, we limit ourselves to government from a social perspective². In the nineteenth and 20th century we see that “the social” becomes increasingly a strategic-epistemological category, deployed in the liberal form of government. Concepts of individual freedom and responsibility fail to facilitate government since problems arise which cannot be attributed to a wrong use of freedom, but which are social in nature, like the problem of poverty. Here “the social state” becomes visible, i.e. a state that wants to insure the individual but also society against the risks which surpass the individual. For this form

² For a description and genealogy of different governmental gazes (see: Dean, 1999; Gordon, 1991; Lemke, 1997; Rose, 1999).

of government(al)ity individuality has a social dimension – freedom comes about within the order of society.

In the “social state”, where government understands itself in relation to (civil) society, it is possible to examine education from a social perspective, i.e. to think about the relation between “education” and “society” and act accordingly. This rather specific governmental gaze is articulated in knowledge concerning the “function” of education for society (its order, progress or development), concerning the relation between a population of students and the rest of the population and concerning normality and abnormality within a population of students. Of course, it is not only articulated in knowledge, but also in specific technologies, such as juridical instruments and control or financial procedures. An illustration of this concern with education from a social perspective is the problem of (in-)equality (Hunter, 1994, p. 98 ff.). Knowledge of the relation between background, performance at school and social destiny makes it possible to examine inequality within a population of pupils. Furthermore, these kind of unequal trajectories can be problematized in relation to welfare and to the progress of society, and open up a space for governmental action. Of course, it should be stressed that popular education was not invented within the social state or only in order to obtain these goals. Modern forms of governmentality will use the disciplinarian-pastoral milieu, which itself has a social dimension. This social dimension is expressed in the type of subjectivity and individuality which should be produced here. In a general sense: someone who is able to objectify herself in a specific way (as being autonomous within society), to problematise herself in a certain way (according to reason, laws, rules and norms within (civil-)society) and to practise freedom in a particular way, is important for the social state.

This short historical excursion clarifies what the “governmentalization of education” is about: a pedagogical-disciplinarian milieu with its pedagogical-(pastoral) gaze receives a tactical productivity in governing a population. Taking into account both important parts of the education apparatus, it is possible to focus on its strategy. On the one hand this strategy is directed to constitute a specific form of individuality and subjectivity, and on the other hand it makes it possible to govern a totality of individuals. Typical for the strategic operation of this apparatus is the double bond of individualization and totalization, a bond which is a characteristic according to Foucault of power relations in the modern governmental state (Foucault,

1982, p. 232). In the social form of this state, the double bond refers to the claim that what constitutes someone as an individual (the social, the norms), is at the same time a link which binds the individual to a totality and renders her governable. To the former, we will refer to as an “individualising principle”: an individual within the social state appears as a normal or social subject, people look at themselves as an individual starting from what is normal within society. However, the normal and social is at the same time a “totalizing principle”: it makes it possible to govern these individuals. In short, the strategy of the modern education apparatus is a double bond of individualization and totalization with the social as point of crystallization: it produces a social individuality which is governable within the social state.

On the basis of these preliminary remarks it is possible to deal with inclusive education and an inclusive society. We will explore the actual “post-modern” form of governmentality, as analysed by Dean, Rose, and others, and called by them “advanced liberalism” (Dean, 1999; Gordon, 1991; Lemke, 1997; Rose, 1999). It is argued that the double bond remains an important feature of the education apparatus. However, neither the social nor the normal, but entrepreneurship (dealing with needs in an entrepreneurial way) and inclusion is now at work as an individualising and totalising principle. Furthermore, as the population of pupils does not disclose itself under a social, but an entrepreneurial and inclusive gaze, “good education for all” has now a different meaning.

*Advanced Liberalism and Inclusion for the Entrepreneurial Self*³

Until recently (at least in countries in Western Europe) “the social” played a crucial role in the governmental regime. In this regime, “the social” and “the economic” are regarded as separate domains and governmental interventions in the name of “the social” (or in the name of social justice or equity) are regarded as necessary for general

³ It is not possible to deal with this in detail within the scope of this paper. For our analysis we draw on Foucault’s courses at the Collège de France, more particularly on *Sécurité, Territoire et Population* (1977–1978) and *Naissance de biopolitique* (1978–1979), courses that are not (yet) published, but which are accessible in the *Centre Michel Foucault* at IMEC (in Paris). For a more detailed analysis: Foucault, 1979, 1981; Gordon, 1991; Rose, 1996a (for the notion “advanced liberalism”), 1999; Lemke, 1997; Dean, 1999. With regard to education: Peters, 2000; Simons, 2002; Masschelein & Simons, 2002.

welfare. Today, as the importance of inclusion shows, the attention for justice and equity is not disappearing. However, according to us it is important to argue that this growing importance of the idea of inclusion is part of a new governmental regime. In order to show this, we will start with a short description of the new regime and its central figure.

In the second part of the 20th century, government from a social perspective is increasingly regarded as problematic. According to a neo-liberal mentality and with reference to different forms of totalitarianism the social state is considered to destroy freedom and thereby also the social body. In reactivation of a liberal attitude, government tries to redefine the domain of freedom – the economic – in a radical way. (Hayek, 1944, p. 27). Government from a social point of view appears now as dangerous with regard to the fundamental principle of competition. In order to create and maintain competition a specific kind of government and of governmental planning is necessary, with special attention to an adequate legal system, “designed both to preserve competition and to make it operate as beneficially as possible” (Ibid, p. 28). Accordingly every social government refusing to start from the principle of competition, and wanting to replace it, is supposed to open up “the road to serfdom”.

However, a critical attitude towards governing from a social point of view is not only a feature of neo-liberalism. During the sixties and seventies various (progressive) cultural and political movements questioned the oppressive and paternalistic dimension of the social state, and the role of social expertise in various institutions (cf. Rose, 1996a, p. 51 ff.; Dean, 1999, p. 153 ff.). What is at stake here is a new idea of freedom (and emancipation), and a whole range of techniques to practice this freedom. Discourses on self-development, self-actualisation and the ability to direct (as a person or collective) one’s own life and future function as a compelling horizon in diverse settings. Without ignoring differences, ideas about learning in freedom (Rogers), programmes on effective parenting (Gordon) and emancipatory education (Freire) introduce displacements with regard to the relative position of the learner and the teacher. In other words, as learning becomes thought of as a main characteristic of human beings the educational relation (as well as educational technologies) and the position of the teacher change. As with social expertise, the educational expertise of teachers (or parents) should focus now on supporting and facilitating the process and project of self-development

and self-actualisation, rather than defining itself the needs and acting upon them.

Both political and cultural movements are mentioned here because they play – each in their own way – a major role in the “assemblage” of a new form of governmentality at the end of the 20th century. Advanced liberalism is seeking to govern through freedom (and competition), and is trying to introduce the discourses and technologies concerning self-actualisation in its project (Dean, 1999, p. 155). To look at oneself from the perspective of actualisation, of development, of a personal project, is the main condition of governing in an advanced liberal way. In order to have a more clear understanding of this new relation between government and self-government, and the rationality, technology and subjectivity involved, we briefly sketch some general characteristics of advanced liberalism.

In order to have a clear point of departure for further analysis, we start with a rather general description of how people are interpellated, i.e. as an “entrepreneur de lui-même” (Gordon, 1991, p. 44; Rose, 1996b, p. 150 ff.; Lemke, 1997, p. 250)⁴. Behaving as an enterprising self implies that one considers oneself and one’s life as the result of the (informed) choices one makes and of the commodities one produces in order to meet one’s needs. These discourses on freedom as entrepreneurship (and on human capital) are able to reintroduce the ideas of self-actualisation and self-development as one of the many needs and aspirations of the enterprising self. In order to actualise and develop the self an entrepreneurial relation towards the self and the environment is indispensable. From this perspective, skills and knowledge have to be regarded as capital, in need of an investment, having financial potential which in turn can function as an input for the production of a commodity or satisfaction (Becker, 1976, p. 14). Life, here, is about choosing “lifestyles”, about making choices everyday and everywhere, turning oneself into a project, improving oneself, one’s relationships and professional life (see Rose, 1996b, p. 157). People are responsible for the “production” of their own well-being and self-actualisation and therefore, a specific kind of self-knowledge and self-mastery is required. In a rather general way we could characterise the freedom and autonomy of the enterprising self as a subjection to a “permanent economic tribunal”, i.e. to the

⁴ We do not argue that we “are” entrepreneurial selves, but we try to indicate how a certain regime creates the place of such a self.

judgement according to the “law of the market”.⁵ It implies a characterisation of one’s life as a producer–consumer with needs and human capital situated in a (market) environment where everything has an (economic) value. However, the entrepreneurial self is not only obsessed with capital, investment and choices, but also with learning and quality. The entrepreneurial self is a producer for herself as a consumer: it produces the satisfaction of its own needs. And when during this production the needs of oneself are taken adequately into account, quality is assured, and at the end even quality of life. Furthermore, as the social environment constitutes the world of an entrepreneurial self, and as the production of the self deals with changes in this environment, the learning process is also a fundamental characteristic of an entrepreneurial life. Thus, managing the learning process is one of the consequences of the subjection to a permanent economic and quality tribunal.

Of course, the enterprising self is not an empirical subject. Rather, its characteristics refer to the type of self-government required in advanced liberalism. Hence, it is important to stress that entrepreneurship is not only the condition for individual freedom and self-actualisation. It is at the same time a guarantee of economic growth and social welfare. In other words, entrepreneurship as a correlate of advanced liberal government, makes the “old” distinction between “the economic” and “the social” obsolete. What is at stake is an “economisation of the social” (Bröckling et al., 2000). However, with this expression we do not want to refer to a condition in which the economic domain has colonised the social domain. This threat of a colonisation was only at stake within the social state (and was then also criticized by a number of intellectuals). Instead, the expression states that the economic has changed itself and that with the figure of entrepreneurship (which of course can have a social dimension) the distinction between the social and the economic is becoming meaningless. In short: government is not positioned against the social individual within a global/national society, but understands itself by reference to a multitude of enterprises (individuals, organisations, services, ...) positioned in a (market)environment. Social relations must now be regarded as the result of an enterprising choice or investment. They last as long as

⁵ The expression “permanent economic tribunal” is used by Foucault in his lecture on march 21th 1979 (see also Gordon, 1991, pp. 41 ff.; Lemke et al., 2000, p. 17; Bröckling 2001, p. 4).

gains are assured or, in other words, until the contract finishes. Furthermore, the social itself – for example being part of a community or sharing values – can now be regarded as a (social) capital in need of permanent investment and as important for individual and collective well-being.

Government with this reality as its correlate is able to claim that the state alone is not responsible for (social) security or healthcare (though these services remain important, but only as “products” produced by public enterprises), since these concerns are and should be to a large extent part of the enterprising life of the citizens themselves. Governing one’s life as an enterprise means that investment in health and security is a major concern. Political government is obliged to create the conditions, which enable everyone to behave as an enterprise. It is obliged to enable and foster competition, mobility, access to information, efficiency of administration, autonomy and responsibility of institutions and services, employability, control by audit, ... Therefore, advanced liberal governmentality does not understand the state as a “social state”, but as an “enabling state” (Rose, 1999, p. 142). It does not relate to a politics of *laissez-faire*, but rather to the subjection of government and its services to a permanent economic tribunal, thereby creating and defending an environment in which people and organisations can behave as enterprises. Furthermore, it is not only about an active and ongoing creation of conditions and control of entrepreneurial behaviour, but it also ensures that everyone is willing to establish an entrepreneurial relation to the self, is willing to invest in one’s own life, willing to offer their capital, willing to sell at a large profit these competencies and knowledge and willing to invest in learning, health and security; and it controls these activities. It is here that inclusion becomes part of the actual governmental regime.

Inclusion, as far as it is related to the entrepreneurial self, has a specific meaning and is related to rather specific governmental techniques. In order to live an entrepreneurial life, it is not enough to have human capital as such. What is required is a “portfolio” of adequate competencies, i.e. competencies necessary or functional to perform in specific environments. However, in order to achieve a permanent inclusion it is also not enough to have this specific stock of human capital. A basic competency or disposition is the willingness to invest in new competencies, to use one’s learning force to renew competencies, to mobilise these competencies and to achieve a state of “employability”. Furthermore, inclusion is not only about having

the adequate competencies and willingness, but it is also about having access. Therefore, access is becoming a major issue for governmental interventions; assuring an accessible infrastructure or at least forcing environments to articulate which competencies are required to have access.

An example to illustrate the relation between entrepreneurship and inclusion is offered by the issue of unemployment (cf. Dean, 1995; Rose, 1999, p. 162). The unemployed or jobless are now addressed as jobseekers, stressing the necessary competencies and attitudes to find a job, but also the investment in skills which have a high market price. Unemployment is problematized from the perspective of entrepreneurship as a lack of some essential qualities. Financial support is conditioned then by the presence of this willingness to invest and to learn, in short by the presence of entrepreneurial qualities. From this perspective Giddens argues that “investment in human capital”, and other ways to enable people to invest in themselves, should be the point of departure for government (Giddens, 2000, p. 130 and 138).

Thus, the problem of inclusion or exclusion is linked up with entrepreneurship, i.e. the presence or absence of entrepreneurial capacities and the willingness to live an entrepreneurial life and to put one’s capital to work. An inclusive society, therefore, is not a society of equals in a principled way, but a society in which everyone has the qualities to meet her needs in an entrepreneurial way.

This illustrates how inclusion is becoming an important part of an advanced liberal regime. We could refer to this as a “socialization of the economic”. Again, it is important to notice here that “the economic” is not considered as a domain (next to others), but as a way of performing in an environment, i.e. entrepreneurship. And the social, being related to entrepreneurship, is precisely about inclusion. This socialization of entrepreneurship or the submission to a “permanent social tribunal” helps us also to understand the widespread use of the notion “stakeholder”. In the (original) context of (strategic) planning/management the notion refers to the idea of taking into account other interests than those of the shareholders (Freeman and McVea, 2001). Strategic management (of a university for example) implies taking into account and including everyone who has a “stake” (customers, communities, environment; local government, ...). Or more specifically, it is a kind of government addressing people as entrepreneurial selves who continuously have to think about the “stake” they have.

This description of the enterprising self finally brings us to a specific double bond of individualisation and totalization. What differentiates people with their particular needs and social positionings is the “capacity” to produce satisfaction and to develop or actualise themselves. From the perspective of productivity differences could be understood as the result of choices to invest in the light of environmental information and changes. Hence, “an enterprising relation to needs” could be regarded as an individualizing principle. What turns us into an individual or individualises us, however, at the same time renders us governable and, as such, functions as the condition for totalization. Acting upon a variable in an environment (e.g. augmenting the cost for breaking a law) makes it possible for people to invest (or des-invest) in a certain behaviour (so that some crime does not pay anymore). At the same time influencing the environment enables a government to turn investment or production into a valuable or even necessary activity (for example, schooling, training, publication, ...). In a more general sense, an entrepreneurial relation to one’s own needs is not in contradiction with the interest of society as a whole. On the contrary, in an advanced liberal regime entrepreneurship appears exactly as the condition for social relations, general welfare and economic growth.

We are now at the point where we are able to describe the strategy of the inclusive education apparatus in terms of a change both in the governmental and in the pedagogical regime and gaze.

The Strategy of the Inclusive Education Apparatus

For government in name of the social, the relation between “education” and “society” functioned as the general horizon for its thinking about schooling. For advanced liberal government this horizon is transformed and schools are now addressed in other ways and interpellated to look at themselves in another way. The main components of this new horizon are “(autonomous) schools” and “environment”. Government does no longer problematizes “education” and “society”, but “schools in an environment”.

In this configuration institutions for education appear primarily (and have to look at themselves) as enterprises producing schooling or human capital as their product or service which pupils and parents can choose as an investment. Of course, for this entrepreneurial choice information (about quality) is required for choosing a school best fitting someone’s preferences and learning needs. Advanced

liberal technologies will create and maintain the best conditions for the entrepreneurial schools, and for the relations between entrepreneurial students (parents) and these schools. Moreover, it is considered a task of government to ensure that everyone has the same opportunities to invest in her/his self and has access to the marketplace of life. Investment in education, as Giddens claims, is an absolute necessity for government, and it is the most important factor in the “redistribution of possibilities” (Giddens, 2000, p. 122). Concerning the “product”, it are the skills and knowledge which enable people to live an entrepreneurial life which are stressed. And as entrepreneurship is about acting in an informed way in an environment and managing one’s learning process all the time, learning to learn is now crucial. In a more general sense, education in this governmental regime should produce the “start up capital”.

The pedagogical regime, the second element of the education apparatus, is also being transformed. The teacher is asked to objectify and problematize the learning process of the student, to understand the classroom as a learning environment and to arrange it in such a way that the student is able to become the manager of her own learning process. In this sense, the teacher is also subjected to a permanent economic and quality tribunal. Teaching is about creating conditions which enable students to behave as “empowered customers”. It is about reflecting on their knowledge, potential and learning needs and about articulating what is able to satisfy these needs and what quality education means for them (cf. Morgan and Murgatroyed, 1994, p. 100 ff.). Within this regime the teacher becomes an “enabling” teacher: “Rather than requiring individuals to adapt to means of instruction”, it is said that, “the desired objective is to adapt the conditions of instruction to individuals to maximize their potential for success.” (Dochy and Moerkerke, 1997, p. 424) This objectification of the classroom as an environment for self directed learning, articulates very clearly what entrepreneurship in education is about: continuously asking if and to what extent everything meets the needs of the student who is directing her own learning process.

Clearly, within this regime the pedagogical gaze, and the way in which the individuality of the student becomes apparent, is changed. However, this does not mean that the student shows her “true face”. The individuality of the student has still a strategic-epistemological dimension within the changed regime. Therefore, this transformation at the level of the pedagogical regime and its pedagogical gaze does not imply the dissolution of the “moral authority” of the teacher. Of

course, this authority is no longer linked with the normal content of a discipline and with a privileged access to it. It is now linked with expertise concerning learning processes and the production of effective and “high quality” learning environments. As learning to learn implies a certain relation to the self, also at this level a specific moral dimension is re-installed. Students have to understand the learning process as a crucial dimension of life, to understand how it enables them to deal with their needs, to choose goals and adequate learning strategies, to use instruments to control their own concentration and motivation and assess progress and results. It is clear that the education apparatus which is being assembled in such a way articulates a strategy connected with advanced liberalism, i.e. producing a specific kind of individuality – an entrepreneurial relation to the self – upon which governmental relations can and should act. At this point, we are able to argue why inclusion becomes important within this configuration.

Up to the sixties and seventies of the 20th century, an exclusion of handicapped or disabled people was not really a central problem. Or rather conversely, excluding them from regular education was somehow thought to be a necessary condition to give such people appropriate treatment (and to observe them with a professional (medical) gaze). The first questioning of a segregated system could be related to the social governmental regime. If the point of departure is the social individual, “whose character was shaped by social influences, who find his or her satisfaction within the social relations of the group”, it appears as a problem when a group of people are segregated and excluded from society (Rose, 1999, p. 133). Thus in the social governmental regime, the exclusion of large parts of the population – due to colour, gender, sexuality or a mental or physical handicap – is a (moral and social-political) problem. A concrete articulation of problematizing exclusion in social terms (and understanding freedom accordingly in social terms), is Wolfensberger’s idea of “normalization” and later of “social role valorisation” (Wolfensberger, 1983, p. 234). These ideas show that the social and especially the problem of (de)valuation at the social level is the point of departure to think about freedom and humanity. This social horizon of problematization make it possible to plea for the integration of handicapped students in regular education. Integration should be preferred above separation since it is only within society one is able to live a valuable life.

Moreover, there has been a growing awareness of the “normality” of regular education, and of the “fact” that it is exactly because of

this that a large part of the population is excluded. Against the background of the social it is possible to argue that and how a handicap is not just or not only a natural characteristic of human being, but is in many cases something correlating with the environment, and more specifically with normality in society or with regular education. Dunn's influential article about the "delinquency of general education" demonstrates for example how special education reduces the "need to deal with individual differences". He claims that "much of special education will continue to be a sham of dreams unless we immerse ourselves into the total environment of our children from inadequate homes and backgrounds and insist on a comprehensive ecological push – with a quality educational program as part of it" (Dunn, 1968, p. 20).

In short, during the sixties and seventies, and in a lot of countries a politics of integration and mainstreaming is established, taking as a starting point that students should be placed in normal settings and taking into account special educational needs. The removal of students from regular education is increasingly seen as a kind of exclusion, and is only legitimated as a last resort – e.g., when the maintenance of regular education for others becomes a problem due to their presence. Since individual freedom and individuality are constructed within society, the isolation of students in special schools is a problem and something which needs to be legitimised.

During the eighties and nineties segregation in education becomes questioned in a more radical way within the so-called "inclusive school movement". We argue that this radicalisation is linked with a transformation of governmental relations, and especially with the introduction of the figure of the entrepreneurial self.⁶

The most radical proponents of inclusion argue that it is no longer about integration or mainstreaming, nor how to legitimate a kind of "gentle exclusion" (Fuchs and Fuchs, 1994, p. 299 ff.). All students should be included in regular education, because segregation does not belong to our modern democracies, i.e. to an "inclusive society". According to Thomas, inclusivity in society is related to the idea of a society of stakeholders, i.e. a society in which each member has a stake (Thomas, 1997, p. 104–105). The notion "stakeholder" – meanwhile very popular in almost every domain of social life – articulates exactly how governmental relations have changed: people are interpellated to look at themselves as having a stake in society, being responsible for

⁶ For a (critical) overview of this movement and its discussions: Skrtic, 1995, 234ff.

managing it and for bringing it in. In other words: they need to establish an entrepreneurial relation to the self and have to consider society as an environment. From this perspective, a “society of stakeholders” is close to a society of entrepreneurial selves, and correlates with advanced liberalism. Furthermore, having a mental or physical handicap (in the traditional sense) in an inclusive society is not a reason for exclusion. Handicapped people are disabled, they have their own special needs and they are able to live an entrepreneurial life, eventually with some additional facilities, just like anybody else. People with disabilities are confronted with problems which differ in degree (they have some additional needs), not in any absolute sense. Exclusion means a lack of opportunities and skills for behaving in an entrepreneurial way in an environment, and thus for choosing, learning to choose and producing whatever fits one’s needs. Inclusion – the remedy for exclusion – is not about integrating everyone in society in order to equip all with a normalised, social identity. Instead, inclusion is about ensuring that entrepreneurship is possible: producing the skills to participate, communicate and invest, and the competencies to construct an identity and to choose what satisfies one’s own needs. Therefore, creating and sustaining inclusion is a permanent concern for government, it is a way to deal with inequality in a society of entrepreneurial selves.

At this point it is possible to consider education from a governmental perspective which has this inclusive society as its correlate. The alternative to a segregated system is now a unitary system (Gartner and Lipsky, 1987, p. 387). On the one hand, institutions for special education should be abolished, while on the other hand mainstream education should be transformed in such a way that it is able to deal with the needs of all students. Indeed, the starting point is the “uniqueness of individuals” – “all students are unique individuals, each with his/her own set of physical, intellectual, and psychological characteristics” – and institutions should take into account the educational needs related to this uniqueness (Stainback and Stainback, 1984, p. 103). This is precisely a main feature of the new pedagogical regime, and more specifically of the strategy of the inclusive education apparatus. It is about “quality education for each and all”. The notion “all” does not refer to a population divided in “normal” and “abnormal” students, with “normal” and “special educational needs”, but to a totality of individuals all having specific, unique needs (cf. Weddel, 1995, p. 101). The notion of “quality education” in this formula refers to an adapted curriculum, effective instruction and

individualized educational strategies (cf. Gartner and Lipsky, 1987, p. 388). It is important to stress again that these needs are not given or natural, but are disclosed within a specific pedagogical regime and with the help of specific instruments (techniques for diagnosis, tests, self-assessment and self-evaluation, ...). The goal of this inclusive apparatus, as argued before, is to cultivate the skills to deal in an entrepreneurial way with one's own needs. And this kind of relation to the self (and its environment) appears as a condition for individual freedom or self-realisation as well as for the welfare of society as a whole.

CONCLUSION: BEYOND INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION?

With the disappearance of the social as a dimension of governmental technologies, the population (of students) is not appearing in its "true" figure. Not just the figure of the entrepreneurial self is an effect and instrument of advanced liberalism, also the exclusiveness of the individual student should be regarded in the same way, i.e. an effect and instrument of the inclusive pedagogical regime. Furthermore, the obsession with inclusion and stakeholders implies a rather specific idea of equality, and a special way to bring it about. To conclude we would like to make some critical remarks by introducing some distinctions – what else is critique about? Of course, we cannot deal with this in detail here. We limit ourselves to some indications.

A main feature of a governmental and pedagogical regime is the objectification of people as individuals and of a group of people as a (kind of) population, "the populational reasoning" (Popkewitz, 1998). What is stressed within this perspective is an identity, some common characteristics or the presence of some necessary skills. Following Rancière and Agamben however, we should make a distinction between "the people" and "the population" and parallelly between "the political" and the government or "la police" (Rancière, 1998, p. 170 ff.; Agamben, 1995, p. 57 ff.). This means that a whole of people cannot be reduced to some general characteristics or qualities. It is always divided and fragmented, irreducible to a unity or identity. Inclusive government negates this original dividedness. Inclusiveness expresses this negation in a radical sense, since it proposes to give everything and every one its own place. But this "own" place is the place of a certain kind of individual (the entrepreneurial individual) and thereby in the same time the place of all individuals (as entrepreneurial individuals). The political in contrast refers to the fact that a people is not coinciding with itself (not identical), that a space is

opened where people are not coinciding with entrepreneurship and not appearing as (equally) entrepreneurs but as political subjects or equals in a radical sense. In a certain sense, a political manifestation, which is the manifestation of political subjects, is about the creation of a world. This world is not (pre)given, it is not an environment, nor a kind of (global) infrastructure out there where people can discuss and argue about problems and solutions. Becoming a political subject is at the same time a creation of the world and being exposed to each other as such (as a singularity) and as equals. This exposition confronts us with the question of living-together and doing justice to each and all. It is a confrontation we did not and could not have expected, and therefore it is not a kind of problem “we” have to deal with. At the level of the world, there is no “we” or common identity, but a kind of community with a debt and the task to do justice to. According to us, within the inclusive regime, and its infrastructure of communication and deliberation, there is no possibility left to create a world and no room for the question about living-together to appear as a question (and not as a problem). To put this in a more radical sense: the obsession with inclusion seems to exclude the political and the world, and in this sense it creates a new kind of “invalidity” or “disability”.

At this point we would like to re-introduce the idea of “education”, and confront it with a pedagogical regime. Education has to do with bringing the child into a world. Again, the world is not a kind of environment or an infrastructure for learning to manage the learning process. The world is a place of being exposed and of the opportunity to begin. Within the inclusive regime every one is an isolate, everyone is interpellated as an individual. Of course, social relations are important but only to the extent that they facilitate individual entrepreneurship or are conceived as social capital to produce well-being. In a world, in our sense, the child is not exposed in the guise of an individual. Exposure in the world questions precisely every kind of individuality.⁷ Education can be seen as being-conducted-out-of (the home with its specific regime), i.e. being conducted into the world. Because of this, we do not think that what is happening in the inclusive regime is a liberation of the student, and least of all students with special needs, from an oppressive and normalizing educational regime. Instead, the inclusive students (with their exclusive needs) remain both effect and

⁷ In this regard the research of Allen on the “mini-regime of governmentality” and the “transgressive practices” of pupils with special needs is highly instructive (Allen, 1999).

instrument of a regime. To give education a chance, maybe we should not try to liberate the student, but liberate ourselves from the (entrepreneurial and exclusive) student.

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