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The 'Renaissance of the University' in the European knowledge society: An exploration of principled and governmental approaches

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Abstract A 'renaissance of the university' in the European knowledge society is regarded today as a necessity. However, there is an ongoing debate about what that renaissance should look like. The aim of this article is to take a closer look at these debates, and in particular, the disputes related to the public role of the (future) university in the European knowledge society. The aim however is not to assess the validity of the arguments of each of the protagonists but to place the discussion within a broader socio-historical context. From a genealogical point of view, and drawing upon the work of Foucault and Hunter, it is possible to distinguish two kinds of milieu, each embodying their own "intellectual technology" and each leading to a specific conception of the public role of the university: firstly the principled milieu (with the persona of the academic as critical intellectual), and secondly the governmental milieu (with the persona of the state official or governmental expert). From this genealogical point of view, I will argue that the modern (research) university was from the very beginning a hybrid institution due to the claims and scopes of both milieus. Furthermore, I will argue that the current discussions reveal the ongoing influence of both milieus and their respective gazes and approaches.

Keywords University · Knowledge society · Policy · Michel Foucault · Ian Hunter · Europe

Introduction

At the beginning of the twenty first century the European Union embraced the strategic objective of becoming 'the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in

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the world' (Lisbon European Council 2000). Part of this overall project was the creation of a European research area (European Commission 2000), a European space of lifelong learning (European Commission 2001) and, initially based on the initiatives of member states, a European space of higher education (Bologna Declaration 1999). The aim of these strategic areas is to mobilise, in an optimal way and at a European scale, available resources in order to fulfil the needs of a knowledge economy and society. These needs are the production of new knowledge and innovation, the training of high-skilled professionals and researchers, and the creation of flexible conditions for lifelong learning. It is acknowledged, moreover, that universities have an important role to play in the knowledge society, for their traditional mission covers these societal needs (European Commission 2003). However, it is also argued that in order to play this role, universities have to deal with the new challenges of increasing research productivity, making more explicit the concern for research based innovation and technology, modifying curricula in order to keep in touch with new demands from the labour market, increasing and diversifying funding, and increasing the contribution to lifelong learning and regional development (European Commission 2003, 2005a, 2006).

These developments, and the related demands directed towards universities, have not passed without contestation or discussion. Although most regard a "renaissance of the university" as a necessity, there seems to be disagreement about what a renaissance of the university in the European knowledge society should look like. This article places this discussion in a broader socio-historical context in order to distinguish from a genealogical point of view two kinds of milieus, each embodying its own "intellectual technology". The notion of intellectual technology refers to a set of specific practices (e.g. self-examination, self-purification), procedures (e.g. statistical data collection, spiritual surveillance), and instruments (e.g. surveys) through which reality becomes an object of thought (e.g. the university, society, public roles, persons and their conduct), and people are positioned as a subject (e.g. as governmental experts, as critical intellectuals) towards that object of thought (Foucault 1982; see also Hunter 1994; Edwards 2004). The analysis in this paper identifies two different intellectual technologies, deployed in two intellectual milieus, each leading to a specific conception of the public role of the university: the principled milieu (with the persona of the academic as critical intellectual) and the governmental milieu (with the persona of the state official or governmental expert). From a genealogical point of view, and drawing upon the work of Michel Foucault and Ian Hunter among others, I will argue that the modern (research) university was from the very beginning a hybrid institution due to the presence of both intellectual technologies and milieus. Furthermore, I will clarify how the current discussions reveal the ongoing influence of both milieus and their respective gazes and approaches to the university's public role.

The modern school: The administrative and pastoral milieu

There are a multitude of studies arguing that the birth of the modern, research university in Europe (and in particular in Germany) is closely related to the development of the modern nation state (see also Haverhals, this issue). This relation is often considered as a kind of consensus between academic interests and the interests of the state. The concept of "consensus" here refers to the idea that the liberal state is conceived of as a guarantee or condition for the autonomy of the university, whereas the "guardian" or "tolerant" state would benefit from granting autonomy to the university (Neave 2006). In Humboldtian terms, this means that scholarship based on "disinterested research" (or *Wissenschaft*) and

"education through research" (or *Bildung)* should be the main principles for the university's internal organisation, while the state must ensure that the university is able to institutionalise this autonomy (von Humboldt 1810/1959; cf. Bathi 1987). The German tradition of public financing of the university and the (non-partisan) appointment of professors is often regarded as a manifestation of this external organisation (cf. Ash 1999). The main issue in this tradition of the university was why the state should authorise and support an institution that explicitly claimed *not* to be a kind of institution for higher vocational education and *not* to have immediate returns for civil society. Why should the state allow a "republic of scholars" working in "isolation and freedom" to exist? (Henningsen 2006, p.100) Yet, within the Humboldtian framework, it is claimed that the research university is not without meaning, since academic enquiry, and self-formation or *Bildung* through enquiry, is regarded as a necessary condition for the individual, for society and the state, and for humanity as a whole to become "enlightened" through culture. Culture refers in this tradition on the one hand to the unity of all knowledge (searched for in *Wissenschaft*) and on the other hand to *Bildung* or the cultivation of character, and as a result: "Through *Bildung*, the nation-state can achieve scientifically the cultural unity that the Greeks once possessed naturally" (Readings 1996, p. 65). From this perspective, the idea of a unified national and reasonable culture, aimed at in *Wissenschaft*, legitimises the autonomy of the university and grounds its public role.

According to Foucault's and Hunter's genealogical reading of history, this argumentation in terms of a consensus runs the risk of drawing too much on idealistic and dialectical premises to be able to capture the "hybrid" character of the modern university and the tensions related to it (Hunter 1994, 1996). Indeed, today critical scholars, drawing for example on the ideas of von Humboldt or Newman persistently, assume that the modern university was the realisation or incarnation of an underlying principle (of the free development of the person through academic inquiry) and consequently argue that its current condition should be judged and reoriented accordingly. Putting aside this kind of principled approach, studies on the genealogy of the modern school system indicate that this system is an assemblage of two different milieus, each with their own intellectual culture and persona, and each reflecting upon the role of schooling in its own way (cf. Hunter 1994; Popkewitz 1998). It is my understanding that this historical assemblage also applies to the modern university. In this section, I will focus in more detail on both milieus in the modern school system, in order to address the modern university in the next section.

The *first* milieu is the administrative, bureaucratic milieu of the modern, governmental state. According to Foucault (2004a, 2004b), a main characteristic of the modern state is its "governmental" concern, that is, its function as an agency for the governing of people. What emerges in the governmental state and its administrative milieu is a particular rationality and technology focusing on the inhabitants of a territory not merely as (legal) subjects but as a population in need of central regulation. Central administration thus embodies a technology of regulation (e.g. prevention campaigns, social regulations) related to a particular intellectual technology (e.g. statistics and "populational reasoning") in order to steer processes at the level of the entire population (Popkewitz 1998; cf. Hacking 1990). Through the application of these intellectual technologies, a governmental understanding takes shape that regards "schooling for the population" as a means to increase the social order and economic prosperity of that population and eventually the wealth of the entire state. It is the persona of the state official that embodies this rationality. According to Hunter (1994, p. 155), and inspired by the analysis of Weber, the persona of the state official, as a governmental expert in schooling, is someone who is trained to detach himself from personal preferences and moral principles, and through intellectual technologies such

as statistics, is able of "routinely transforming the exigencies of government into technical problems to technical solutions". For this persona, schooling becomes a policy domain or a domain of governmental reflection, that is, schooling is a target for governmental intervention and an instrument to achieve particular policy goals (such as health and social hygiene, training of civil servants, obedient citizens, economic prosperity) (cf. Melton 1988). To sum up (ignoring historical and regional differences): the first milieu is that of the governmental state and its administrative centre that approaches schools as public services guaranteeing that people are properly trained as "good citizens".

The governmental state however has not invented a school system with these objectives in mind. Instead, it uses and modifies a setting which has its own history, its own intellectual technologies, and its own persona. It is important, therefore, to identify the *second milieu*: the milieu of pastoral technologies. "Pastoral" has to be understood here in a Foucauldian sense (Foucault 1978, 1982). It refers to the technology of the self or the specific Christian pedagogy through which people come to concern themselves with themselves and come to regard themselves as self-reflective and autonomous persons. It is through a pedagogic confrontation with the persona of the pastor, her spiritual guidance, and moral authority, and through techniques of self-surveillance that people begin to see themselves as capable of self-reflection and self-regulation, and to regard moral and rational autonomy as an ideal. What I want to stress is that the modern classroom cannot be understood without taking into account this Christian pedagogy of spiritual discipline: "a space of ethical formation in which the students are placed under the continuous ethical supervision and problematising gaze of a teacher who embodies both moral authority and pastoral care". (Hunter 1994, p. 57) The modern school is a carefully arranged milieu of self-surveillance and self-control where students are to be transformed into particular "individuals", that is, establishing a particular relation of the self to the self in order to conceive of oneself as an intellectual, rational being or self-reflective person (Foucault 1972/1989).

From this genealogical point of view, the capacity for self-reflection and self-regulation (and the related pedagogic ideal of a moral and rational life) is not an essential or universal human capacity. Instead, the intellectual technologies, that is, the combination of detailed surveillance and self-examination rooted in the Christian pastorate, bring about a human subject that regards itself as having such an ability for rational self-reflection and self-determination. In line with this, the governmental state did not invent a system for schooling to achieve governmental goals. In order to achieve its aim of social training, the governmental state uses these technologies and consequently, the self-reflective individual is put at the service of the state in order to make society (or the totality) governable (Foucault 1978, 1982). The governmental state uses pastoral pedagogy in (private or public) schools in order to meet through social training what it regards as the public needs of social order, economic prosperity, and civil obedience.

To understand the modern school system as a kind of "hybrid assemblage" (Hunter 1994), combining bureaucratic technologies and pastoral technologies, and their respective intellectual milieus and personae, raises questions about a (dialectical or idealistic) depiction of the school as the expression or realisation of an underlying principle (such as, e.g., the free development of the person). In elaborating on this in the next section, I will offer some evidence for the similar hybrid character of the modern "research" university.

The hybrid character of the modern research university

As explained earlier, and in line with Hunter (1994), the "administrative intellectual" is a persona with a particular detached attitude, capable of regarding people as resources of the state in need of training, and capable of being involved in the management of schooling and society. In the modern, governmental state, schools become "governmentalized", that is, their pastoral pedagogy and spiritual discipline, are used to contribute to what are regarded as the educational needs of civil society. In this respect, Prussian "cameralism"—the predecessor of modern study of public administration and concerned with mobilising the Prussian population in view of strengthening the power of the state—reflected upon education from this governmental point of view. For instance, the leading Prussian "cameralist" von Justi stressed in the middle of the eighteenth century, and in view of the economic and moral mobilisation of each and all, "it is not less needful to educate good and useful citizens than good Christians". (von Justi, in Small 1909/2001, p. 252) Additionally, von Justi underlines the importance of instruction in "cameral" sciences (the science of statecraft, police administration and commerce) at the universities and in order for these "public foundations of the state" to be able to train young people "to render useful services to the commonwealth." (von Justi, in Small 1909/2001, p. 249) A major concern for von Justi, and based on his observation that "half of the scholars living today are utterly dispensable parasites", is the growth of an "academic proletariat" (von Justi, in Melton 1988, p. 115). Hence, from the viewpoint of the administrative intellectual, there is a clear governmental concern for social and economic welfare, and for reforming the university in order to be able to train good and useful citizens (and state-officials).

As educational scholars, however, we are more acquainted with a principled and liberal conception of the modern university such as the Humboldtian idea formulated a few decades later. This idea regards the university as an institution founded on a pure, fundamental principle, that is, the capacity for self-reflection and the complete development of the person based on universal reason or *Wissenschaft.* As I have argued in the previous section, it is difficult to maintain the idea that the school and the university are the realisation of a principle (of the free and harmonious development of one's faculties). Notwithstanding the attractive ideas and ideals of the reformers of the university in the beginning of the nineteenth century (in Germany), the governmental milieu, and its interest in schooling and higher education as social training, remains a constitutive component of the modern university system (cf. Ash 1999). This is not to suggest that the ideas of these reformers or "critical" intellectuals did not play a role in the modern university. For their ideas on fundamental principles and rational self-determination they rely on the technologies of spiritual discipline; these technologies enable them to represent the university as the incarnation of a principle. Hence, it is the arrangement of this milieu in the modern university, as well as the persona of the critical (universal, humanist) intellectual, that have to be taken into account.

Kant and von Humboldt, for example, could be regarded as critical intellectuals and exponents of spiritual discipline and self-reflection. Evidently, for their ideas about self-reflection and self-governance, they no longer drew upon religious doctrine. Yet, their "enlightened" critical and rational perspectives still required intellectual technologies of self-examination and surveillance rooted in pastoral discipline. This becomes clear when their philosophy, and more specifically their metaphysics, is not just approached at the theoretical level but also at the level of the pedagogy it embodies and the self-formation or relation of the self to the self it seeks to bring about (Foucault 2001; Hunter 2002, 2006; cf.

Hadot 1995/2003). Hunter (2002) convincingly explains how in, or rather through, his *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant induced a belief or "metaphysical faith" in the "idea of a pure intelligible world, as a totality of intelligences to which we ourselves belong as rational beings" or a "universal kingdom of ends in themselves." Kant positioned himself as someone who inhabits this kingdom, carefully demonstrating what it requires to conduct oneself in accordance with its universal laws and submitting oneself to the "tribunal of reason". Drawing upon a kind of moral authority he actually taught students to conceive of themselves as a "homo duplex" (inhabiting both the intelligible and sensible world, or divided into a form-giving intellect and sense-giving feelings) and induced them to the morals of metaphysics. In a similar way, von Humboldt's (1792/1854, p.11) idea that "the true end of Man (…) is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole" should primarily be seen as an attempt to induce a particular relation of the self to the self. As such, it is not just important to look at what critical intellectuals say or write, but what they do throughout their writings and how they address their audience. What they do through their proclaimed insight into fundamental principles is, according to Hunter (1994, p. 8) positioning themselves as a "personification of this principle through a socially prestigious comportment". Hence, the critical intellectual, as inhabiting the "kingdom of truth" and withdrawing herself from the "civil kingdom" and spheres of government, is the persona who claims to see the principles underlying the civil kingdom that should be taken into account for a complete development of the person. In line with this, the research university becomes a setting where students have to submit themselves to the "intellectual technology" of *Wissenschaft* and in particular to the norms and rules of research and to the surveillance of the professor. The submission to the "dictates of reason", embodied in the discipline of research, and throughout the intellectual technologies of metaphysics or idealistic philosophy, becomes the condition for a student to be concerned with the self in view of a harmonious development of one's faculties. In sum, while bringing *Wissenschaft* into the old, scholastic university, the reformers in fact modified the milieu of spiritual discipline and sought to promote in students a *principled* relation of the self to the self and to the world.

The ambiguity of the principled approach

This short sketch of the figure of the critical intellectual and her research milieu helps to understand her ambiguous position within the modern university. In withdrawing from governmental concerns, the persona of the critical intellectual, with her vision on principles beyond those of the civic world, regards himself as morally and intellectually superior. For example, the governmental objective of social training and the optimal use of resources for the state, as articulated in an exemplary way by von Justi, is criticized for being one-dimensional and ignoring the full moral and intellectual development of the person. There is particularly a resistance to conceive of actual society and citizenship as the highest form of the public sphere or the highest form of freedom. As formulated by Kant in an exemplary way in his article "What is Enlightenment?" (1784/2000, p.59) from a critical, principled perspective actual society is rather regarded in a certain sense as "private" (or as "civil kingdom") opposed to the "public (civic) sphere" as something that transcends actual society (the "kingdom of truth" or "cosmopolitanism") (cf. Hunter 2002; Laursen 1986). In a similar way, the neo-humanist pedagogue Pestallozi (1963, p. 176) is concerned that educating people for society could result in a kind of "bürgerliche Halbmensch" and von Humboldt (in Krautkrämer 1979, p.33) fears that "der Mensch dem Bürger geopfert

wird." What is at stake in these critical positions becomes clearly visible in how von Humboldt (1792/1854, p.67) positions himself in the discussion on the relation between human freedom, culture and state power: "Whence I conclude, that the freest development of human nature, directed as little as possible to ulterior civil relations, should always be regarded as paramount in importance with respect to the culture of man in society. He who has been thus freely developed should then attach himself to the State; and the State should test and compare itself, as it were, in him". Thus holding to the principle of the free development of human nature, von Humboldt argues for a dialectical reconciliation of personal development and the realisation of the state through culture. As a kind of extrapolation and projection of one's position of critical, universal intellectual, the university is regarded as a "republic of scholars" oriented to a principle that transcends the state and civil society and their merely practical and one-sided concerns. In short, this kind of critical approach is in one way or another "privatising" what the administrative intellectual regards as the public sphere and reserving the "real" public sphere for intellectuals and scholars realizing a rational or spiritual community (Seidler 2002). Yet, this critical and idealistic position is ambiguous for what seems to be lost out of sight is the hybrid character of the modern university housing both governmental and spiritual technologies. Furthermore, what seems to be ignored while taking the principle of universal reason for granted is the way one's own position is rooted in spiritual technologies.

For my argument, it is important to stress that the critical, principled position did not disappear. At the level of the intellectual technologies and persona, and despite obvious differences, there is continuity from the Kantian idea of universal reason to, for example, Habermas' idea of communicative reason, for both exemplify a principled approach towards the university and its public role. Without discussing the complexities of Habermas's work, I will offer some evidence to make this continuity apparent.

Habermas regards modernity as an "unfinished project" and views history as the (learning) process of a growing, rational self-determination, both at individual and collective levels. The process of learning is a possibility that is offered through language itself and aims at what is given as a counterfactual presupposition in language, namely the possibility of mutual understanding and consensus (Habermas 1990a, p. 235). The university can play a role in strengthening communicative rationality because of the communicative character of academic discourse and argument, and the learning processes involved therein. Habermas does not, however, think of the university as the institutionalisation of an ideal and universal form of life (as did von Humboldt). This would be incompatible with his idea of our society as a *leitbildlose* society–a society without (substantial, ethical) leading or regulating ideas (Habermas 1990b). Notwithstanding the fact that Habermas takes into account the fragmentation of the life-world, the pluralisation of life forms and functional differentiation (also within the university); he also holds to the idea that the university as a kind of self-governing community is governed in an exemplary way by procedures of deliberation (and not merely by money and power) through which society has to come to an understanding of itself. For it is through discussions in the life-world, to be regarded as the public sphere and aiming at consensus, that illegitimate (state) power, particularism and self-enclosed systems could be recast. And because the "community of scholars", even within the disciplinary boundaries of specialised research, is involved in these public discussions and learning processes the university is a valuable milieu for students to be prepared for public life.

What I want to stress at this point is that in a similar way as Kantian metaphysics, Habermasian critical theory could be regarded at the level of the pedagogy or technology of self-purification it embodies. What it seeks to bring about is a relation to the self that

commences to conceive of the self as a possible free and equal participant of a community where only the force of the better argument holds sway. The relation to the self that is required for such a belief (in the force of the better argument, as well as in an ideal speech situation and in modernity as an unfinished project) or such a distrust (towards coordination based on power and money, and strategic reasoning) to emerge and make sense is not given, but requires a particular intellectual technology (cf. Hunter 2006, p. 84). This intellectual technology of the "school of Critical Theory" is the condition for withdrawal from the world of strategic rationality and from particular interests, and to promote as a projection of ones position as critical intellectual the idea and ideal of an ideal speech community and its (presupposed) existence within the university. Hence, what the critical intellectual takes for granted and regards as universal (e.g. the principles of communicative rationality) presupposes in fact a particular relation of the self to the self being produced through particular intellectual technologies.

I explained that the modern university is from the very beginning a hybrid institution housing different milieus and personae, each drawing upon their own intellectual technologies to understand the university and its public role. Education in general, and higher education and research in particular, is for the persona inhabiting the educational office a target for governmental planning in order to meet social, political, and economic needs. In line with this gaze, governmental experts regard (higher) education and universities as "public" services (without necessarily being state institutions) and resources for strengthening economic development, social welfare, and civic obedience or democratic participation. From this governmental gaze, the notion "public" refers to the source of these institutions' funding, and/or to the "nature of the output or 'goods' (who benefits and how the goods are distributed)." (cf. Marginson 2006, p. 48) The horizon of governmental reasoning is a kind of civil "enlightenment" through manpower planning, social engineering and social training.[1] From this perspective of governmental reasoning, private concerns such as personal development and moral or confessional education are not ignored but considered (at least within certain limits) as an objective next to or presupposed within public objectives.

Pastoral or humanist intellectuals, in proclaiming the full development of the person and withdrawing themselves from the governmental sphere, draw upon another intellectual technology: the pastoral technology of surveillance and self-examination or, within the research university, the self-exercise of critical philosophy which views an integrated, moral person inhabiting a rational, self-purified (university-based research) community. In addition, for the critical intellectual, the free harmonious development of the person (in the university as community of scholars) is regarded to be the limit of governmental concerns and planning, as well as (from the intellectual's dialectical point of view) the ultimate and necessary "public" touchstone for its legitimacy. Hence, the notion "public" here refers not merely to the nature of outputs and issues of funding, but to the public character of for instance the sphere inside the university and its (critical) relation to "a larger public sphere beyond the university". (ibid., p. 51) The horizon could be labelled as a moral "enlightenment" through personal development within and in view of a rational community. The modern conception or "idea" of the university as an institution oriented towards the

[1] The use of the concept "enlightenment" in this context may sound strange for the concept is often related to the project of the persona of the critical intellectual (Kant, von Humboldt). As Hunter (2000) explains however, we should keep in mind that a so-called "civil enlightenment" (drawing upon Pufendorf and others, and related to the pacification of early-modern states) preceded the "metaphysical enlightenment" (in the Kantian sense).

kingdom of truth or an intellectual self-governing community or republic that transcends the "civil kingdom", is the ultimate embodiment of this approach. The perception of the one-sidedness of the "civil enlightenment" in this conception, and the related project of a dialectical (political, democratic) reconciliation, should be regarded as a projection of the position of the critical intellectual and its moral authority.

Notwithstanding its limited scope, and while ignoring geographical, historical, and intellectual varieties, this genealogy offers us a valuable perspective to address the discussions about the role of the university in the European knowledge society.

The governmental and principled approach today

The genealogy in the previous parts helps to picture the current debates and discussions not merely at the level of the arguments, but foremost at the level of the intellectual technologies and modes of reasoning upon which these arguments rely. As such, this genealogical exploration makes it possible to start describing current intellectual technologies, and how they render "the university" visible and intelligible today: what are the technologies that enable persona to reflect upon the university as being in need of a "renaissance"?

In the Lisbon Declaration, the "European knowledge society" is put forward as a well-defined policy target related to operational governmental strategies (Lisbon European Council 2000). The policy objectives and strategies are concerned with economic issues such as a competitive knowledge economy, but cover as well so-called social and cultural challenges such as sustainable employability, social inclusion, equal opportunities, European citizenship, and cultural diversity (European Commission 2005b). In view of these governmental objectives, research, higher education and innovation, as well as universities combining these activities, are regarded as crucially important: "If it is to achieve its ambition of becoming the world's most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy and society, Europe simply must have a first-class university system—with universities recognised internationally as the best in the various fields of activities and areas in which they are involved."(European Commission 2003, p. 22) The title of another communication from the European Commission is instructive with regard to its governmental scope: "Mobilising the brainpower of Europe: enabling the universities to make their full contribution to the Lisbon strategy" (European Commission 2005a). Consequently, what is needed is a "modernisation agenda for universities" focusing on the attractiveness and excellence of European universities (based on institutional differentiation on the basis of one's strengths), new modes of internal governance of universities (able to set strategic goals and to adopt professional human resource management) and increased funding (through diversifying sources and focusing more on the relevant student or research output than merely on the input) (European Commission 2006).

In these documents, the domain of (higher) education in general and universities in particular, is transformed into a field for governmental reasoning and planning through the application of particular intellectual technologies. One such technology is the collection of international statistics on performance indicators and benchmarks in order to objectify for example the "human capital and innovation gap", "higher education attainment", "access to higher education" and "research performance" in comparison to other countries, such as the US, Canada and Japan (European Commission 2005a, p. 3). The use of numbers and international statistics clearly functions as an intellectual technology to "make up the objects of domains upon which a government is required to operate" and this technology

itself actually "makes education policy" (Rose 1999, p. 197; Lindblad 2001, p. 18). Another technology is the Open Method of Coordination. In the wake of the Lisbon strategy this method of coordination is formally initiated to help Member States to progressively develop their own policies by means of spreading best practice and in order to achieve greater convergence towards the main EU goals (Lisbon European Council 2000, §37). With regard to the "modernization agenda for universities" this method could be used for "identifying and spreading best practice and supporting Member States in their search for more effective university regimes" (European Commission 2006, p. 11). Throughout this procedure of coordination, and the evaluation and comparison of university regimes within member states in view of the Lisbon strategy, the university enters a "calculative space" (of effectiveness and efficiency), and becomes an object of governmental reasoning and a target for managerial regulation (Haahr 2004, p. 223).

Understanding technologies such as these is necessary to grasp how the "European university" becomes visible and intelligible today, i.e. how it becomes an object of governmental thought today and how it becomes a target for governmental intervention. It is also at the level of these technologies that one should look for the emergence of a new administrative culture and milieu housing new personae (both at the European level and at the level of the member states). Although it is beyond the scope of this article to point out differences with the persona of the administrative intellectual in the old educational bureau, the preceding description clarifies some features of its governmental mode of reasoning.

What takes shape is the persona of the European administrative intellectual or "eurocrat" who is problematising the existing university in view of the economic, social, and political needs within the knowledge society. What the knowledge society needs is an optimal mobilization of useful brainpower in order to bring about economic prosperity (through research based innovation, sustainable employability), social welfare (through knowledge based regional development, increased higher education attainment), and democratic participation (through the promotion of citizenship competencies). This delineation of the field of governmental intervention is the condition for starting to explore the role of the university as a public service in so-called "future scenarios" (cf. European Commission 2002, p. 56). The concept "public" in these governmental discussions refers to sources of funding and the nature of the output. What is observed here is a tendency in Europe to increase private funding, privatise the distribution of "outputs", and stimulate responsiveness to private (business) demands. Nevertheless, there is as well a political counter-movement stressing the public dimension and choosing another future scenario. For these opponents, although sharing the same governmental gaze, the public function refers for example to the production of knowledge as a public good and to issues of general accessibility and dissemination. It is not my aim to explore these discussions in detail, but to stress that the political interests motivating these discussions are part of the governmental sphere and deploy a similar perspective. In sum, it is an administrative and political perspective that reflects upon the modernization of the university in terms of an optimal (private/public) mobilization of (private/public) resources in teaching, research, and innovation in view of clear (private/public) needs in the knowledge society. Furthermore, this should be regarded as the current "civil enlightenment" of Europe and its member states driven by the Lisbon strategy.

Let us focus now on the "real" opponents, i.e. the opponents drawing upon other intellectual technologies to transform the "European university" into an object of thought. An ongoing debate is whether the Lisbon strategy, through its strategic areas of research, education and lifelong learning, is a kind of one-dimensional project focusing on economic

and technological development and accordingly reducing the role of universities: "(…) Moving beyond the Lisbon Agenda that is driven by considerations of economic and technological development, the EUA (European University Association, M.S.) would like to highlight the role of the universities in the wider debate on the construction of Europe, and the promotion of European values, culture and linguistic diversity, which we consider particularly important in the present international environment" (EUA 2003, p. 1). Hence, it is being debated whether responsiveness towards economic and technological needs covers the university's role. With regard to the latter the traditional idea of the university is often recalled, and in particular in its up-dated form in the *Magna Charta Universitatum Europaeum*.

The *Magna Charta* (1988) proclaims the "fundamental principles, which must, now and always, support the vocation of universities". The first principle explains why the one-dimensional scope of the Lisbon-strategy is regarded as a threat: "The university is an autonomous institution at the heart of societies differently organized because of geography and historical heritage; it produces, examines, appraises and hands down culture by research and teaching. To meet the needs of the world around it, its research and teaching must be morally and intellectually independent of all political authority and economic power". (Magna Charta Universitatum 1988) Listening to these ideas, and similar statements such as "a university is a trustee of the European humanist traditions" and "its constant care is to attain universal knowledge" it is not difficult to see that the EUA echoes the position of the critical, humanist intelligentsia. This is even more clearly illustrated when the EUA stresses for example that universities should be regarded as "institutions" (and not merely as functional organisations); they should "communicate the key role of research in underpinning university autonomy" and should stress their "public responsibility" and "cultural mission" (and not merely their added value for economic development) (EUA 2003, pp. 1–3). This is not to say that the EAU does not participate in the policy debate on the nature of outputs or funding resources for universities. There is for instance a clear "policy" statement on upholding "public funding" (EUA 2005). Mentioning explicitly notions such as "culture", "universal knowledge" and "responsibility", the EUA however refers also to the public dimension of the university's internal organisation and its relation to the larger public sphere beyond the university.

What the EUA does, at least when it draws upon these principles and claims a position of moral and social authority, is once more defending a moral or cultural enlightenment that transcends the civil enlightenment European governmental experts have in mind. While regarding these principles as embodying human nature, taking them for granted or merely attributing them to a long-standing tradition (as seems to be the case today), this position however does not take into account the intellectual technologies that produce(d) such a principled view. Drawing upon my genealogy, I think the least that is required today is a clarification and understanding of this presupposition. However, it is important to stress again that this clarification is not in the first place about the validity of presuppositions at the level of doctrines, but about the intellectual technologies of self-examination and surveillance that the university encapsulates today.

The "Empty Spot" of the current principled milieu

From the perspective of the critical intellectual, the modern university should bring about the free development of the person through the pedagogy of *Wissenschaft* or critical theory

and the related intellectual technologies. The operation of these intellectual technologies (that is, a particular procedure of self-reflection and self-examination) has been from the very beginning a blind spot in the self-conception of the critical intellectual and its projection of an idea of the university. Today however, it seems as if it is not merely a blind spot but an "empty" spot. Indeed, the lack of a substantial idea of the university today (or the reliance on tradition) could be regarded as the result of the disappearance of an intellectual milieu and technology producing a principled view. This, however, does not imply that the research university disappears, but that the intellectual technologies organising its teaching and research are modified along with the changes at the governmental level. This can be illustrated by drawing upon a report from a European expert group dealing with the "development of higher education/research relations in the perspective of the European research area" (European Commission 2002).

According to this expert group, the goal of higher education, including higher education at universities in the European knowledge society is twofold: general education through "producing educated 'critical' citizens" on the one hand and professional training through focusing on competencies for "sustainable employability." (ibid., p. 29) Exploring these issues, the report states that in the present knowledge society "the goal of educating for 'sustainable employability' is compatible with the academic ideal of educating for active and critical citizenship." (ibid., p. 29) It is stressed that both goals require similar competencies. The equation of both goals could be regarded however as a symptom of the disappearance of the critical, principled approach. From the perspective of the critical intellectual (and her principled idea of the university), the academic ideal is mainly about the cultivation of the person or free, personal development in view of a moral enlightenment. This ideal however is no longer mentioned. The ideal is reformulated in terms of "active and critical citizenship", and is regarded as a clear governmental objective—the reduction of the "democratic deficit" in Europe—and to include European citizens in new modes of European governance. Hence, the governmental concern for and objective of a socially trained citizenry in a knowledge society appears to be dominant; both "sustainable employability" and "active citizenship" are urgent governmental concerns. Against this governmental horizon, personal development is reframed as a private issue and a matter of personal interests or preferences. The disappearance of the critical, principled approach becomes even more explicit when taking a closer look at how the report reflects upon the educational reform needed to meet the goals of sustainable employability and active citizenship.

The report argues that competencies required for research are remarkably similar to the basic competencies for citizenship and sustainable employability and hence "education through research" is an optimal educational strategy (European Commission 2002, p. 38). It is tempting to comprehend this argument as a manifestation of the principled approach because "education through research" is traditionally one of the principles of the critical intellectual's conception of the university. However, "education through research" is not viewed from a principled perspective here. To regard research (and employability and citizenship) in terms of competencies presupposes a particular gaze and consequently a particular intellectual technology, that is, an instrumental transformation of manifestations of human behaviour in manageable and transferable components (cf. Masschelein and Simons 2005). Hence, a new persona enters the scene: the expert in educational management for whom (and this is clearly illustrated in the European report) research becomes a domain for educational reflection and programming and who regards "research as the ground for employability-oriented higher education". (European Commission 2002, p. 40) This expert looks from a managerial, instrumental perspective to "education through re-

search" and in view of what from a governmental perspective are the needs of the knowledge society. Consequently, the persona of the educational expert becomes an accomplice of the governmental strategy to produce a socially trained citizenry.

Conclusions

Drawing upon a genealogy of the university in line with the studies of Foucault and Hunter, it is problematic to regard the modern university as the realisation of an underlying principle. Moreover, it is no longer justifiable to conceive of it as a failed or distorted realisation of such a principle caused by illegitimate governmental interference or pressing economic and social forces. Furthermore, the research university up until now houses a tension between a kind of "moral" and "civil" enlightenment, and as a consequence an ambiguity with regard to its public role.

This genealogy might help to explore and understand some additional issues. It might help to explain for example, the ongoing reference of academics to von Humboldt and to the cherised "unity" of research and education. In line with Hunter, we should not understand this as a reference to what really happens or what really is going on, but foremost as a kind of expression of one's "status-ethos" and a justification of one's moral and social authority. Maybe this also helps to understand the somehow remarkable results of empirical research on the "research-teaching nexus" that there is more evidence for the belief in (or myth of) a positive relation than for there actually being a relation (see Verburgh et al., this issue). Through the gaze of the persona of the principled intellectual, any attempt to empirically observe a nexus is somehow meaningless, for it is about fundamental principles. Hence, referring to these principles this persona is able to disqualify the "empirical" gaze of the empirical researcher as being "limited". But as explained earlier, the persona of the critical academic tends to forget that *her* withdrawal from the "empirical world", and *her* critical position relies on particular intellectual technologies as well. Therefore, the empirical researcher is also in a position to criticise the critical academic. She could disqualify for instance the persistent belief of such academics in underlying principles for lacking any empirical evidence and hence for being a "myth".

This tension, and the game of mutual exclusive positions, once more stresses the importance of focussing on assumptions at the level of intellectual technologies in order to grasp what is meant for example with "public role" or "education through research". What such an investigation should take into account are the hegemonic tendencies, not merely at the level of doctrine and ideology but primarily at the level of these intellectual technologies (and the persona drawing upon them). For it seems as if the decline of the role of the critical intellectual, its intellectual culture and its moral authority or social prestige goes hand in hand with the growing importance and almost omnipresence of the administrative, managerial intellectual and educational expert. Moreover, it seems as if today the latter persona tends to forget her reliance upon a rather particular intellectual milieu and technology in order to grasp what education, research, and the university are and should be about.

In view of this observation, and although I transcend the genealogical attitude underlying this article at this point, it could be important to explore the university and its public role beyond both a principled and governmental perspective. What I have in mind is an exploration of those new (teaching, research) activities and practices in and outside universities that try to resist the overwhelming managerial/educational intervention, while at

the same time no longer looking for justification in fundamental principles. Maybe these new activities and practices, such as the "Collège international de philosophie" (Derrida) or "open source" initiatives in view of "free" academic publications, express a new public dimension of universities.

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